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An extensive literature documents and discusses the role of financial
markets in economic development.  In an exhaustive study of three dozen
developed and developing countries over the period 1860-1963, Goldsmith (1969)
provides evidence of a positive relationship between the ratio of financial
institutions' assets to GNP and output per person.  Goldsmith also presents
data showing "that periods of more rapid economic growth have been accompanied,
though not without exception, by an above-average rate of financial
development." (p.48)  In addition, Romer (1989),  Barro (1989),  and others have
shown, using cross-country data sets that range from twenty to over one hundred
years, that there exist startling differences in per capita output growth rates
with no tendency for these growth rates to converge.2  This paper helps
explain these observations, which have not been previously reconciled  within
the context of a general equilibrium optimizing model.
Along with recent work by Bencivenga and Smith (1988), Greenwood
and Jovanovic  (1989), and Greenwald and Stigliz (1989), this paper constructs a
model that links the financial system with the steady state growth rate of per
capita output.3  Specifically, the model extends and links two Literatures.
The endogenous growth literature, associated with the work of Romer (1986,
1990) and Lucas (1988), constructs models in which agents make decisions that
fully determine the economy's steady state growth rate.  The financial
stri'ctures  literature, associated with the  work of Townsend (1979),  Diamond
(1984), and Diamond and Dybvig (1983), constructs models in which financial
contracts emerge as optimal responses to an economy's informational and risk
characteristics.  This paper constructs an endogenous growth model in which a
stock market emerges to allocate risk and explores how the stock  market alters
investment incentives in  ways that change steady state growth rates.-2-
As in most  of the  endogenous  growth  literature,  steady  state  per  capita
growth  only occurs  in this  paper  if  agents  make investment  decisions  that  yield
sufficiently  high rates  of  human  capital  accumulation  and  technological
progress.4 Human  capital  and technology  are  augmented  in "firms",  where
groups  of people  invent,  innovate,  and  produce  together  in a long-run  process
[Prescott  and  Boyd 19871. Unique  to this  paper,  there  is  an  externality
associated  with physical  caiital  in  the  creation  of  human  capital;  the  average
amount  of capital  maintained  in a firm  during  the  entire  production  process
positively  affects  the  human  capital  of each  member  independently  of that
individual's  own  investment. This  externality  implies  that  people  who
prematurely  remove  capital  from firms  reduce  the  rate  of  human  capital
accumulation  of remaining  members. Since  growth  is inextricably  tied  to  human
capital  accumulation,  premature  capital  liquidation  retards  economic  growth.
This  model  has two  characteristics  that  elicit  the  creation  of financial
contracts:  liquidity  risk  and  productivity  risk.  Productivity  risk  arises
because  firms  are  subject  to productivity  shocks  in the final  period  of
production. This  productivity  risk  discourages  risk averse  investors  from
investing  in firms. Stock  markets  allow  individuals  to invest  in  a large
number  of firms  and  diversify  away  idiosyncratic  productivity  shocks. Thus,
stock  markets  can  raise  the  fraction  of resources  devoted  to  human-capital-
augmenting  firms  and,  thereby,  accelerate  per  capita  growth.
A second  feature  of the  model  that  encourages  financial  contracting  is
liquidity  risk,  which  is  created  by the  model'_  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)
preference  structure. Specifically,  agents  choose  how much to  invest  in firms
that take  a long-time  to  produce  and  how  much to invest  in  a less  profitable
but liquid  asset  that  pays  off  quickly. The liquid  asset  does  not  augment
human capital  or technology  and, therefore,  does not contribute  to growth.
After making  decisions,  some  individuals  receive  liquidity  shocks  and  discover3-
that they  want to consume  their  wealth  before  firms  create  new technologies,
sell  goods,  and  distribute  profits. Even  though  the  premature  liquidation
value of firm  capital  is small,  agents  receiving  these  privately  observed
shocks  remove  their  capital  from  firms. Thus,  the  risk  of receiving  a
liquidity  shock  may  discourage  firm  investment.  If liquidity  shocks  were
publicly  verifiable,  standard  insurance  contracts  would  eliminate  the  liquidity
risk faced  by individuals. Since  liquidity  shocks  are  not  publicly  observable,
alternative  financial  contracts  may  arise  to  mirtigate  liquidity  risk.
Stock  markets  may emerge  in this  model  to  help  agents  cope  with liquidity
risk  by allowing  those  entrepreneurs  receiving  liquidity  shocks  to sell
their "shares"  to other  investors.  Agents  who  do not  receive  a liquidity  shock
will want to purchase  shares  with  liquid  assets  because  firms  enjoy  a higher
expected  rate  , return  than  liquid  assets. One  result  is that  capital  is  not
prematurely  removed  from firms  to satisfy  short-run  liquidity  needs.  Due  to
the  externality  in  human  capital  production,  remaining  firm  members  enjoy  a
higher  rate  of human  capital  accumulation  than  they  would  in the  absence  of
stock  markets,  and  output  grows  faster. Furthermore,  even  without  the
externality,  stock  markets  may  encourage  firm  investmeu.t  and  growth  by re,  4cing
the  liquidity  risk  associated  with firm  investment.  I
Although  Diamond  and  Dybvig  (1983)  argue  that  banks  can  reproduce  the
equilibrium  that  would  exist  if  liquidity  shocks  were  publicly  observable,
Jacklin (1987)  shows  that  their  solution  is  not incentive  compatible  unless
severe  restrictions  are imposed  on private  transactions.5  This  paper  does  not
impose  these  trading  restrictions.  Although  this  paper's  stock  market
equilibrium  yields  a lower  level  of expected  utility  than  if each individual's
liquidity  shock  were  publicly  verifiable,  the  stock  market  equilibrium  reduces
risk and  improves  welfare  above  that  of the  no-financial-market  case.6- 4 -
The  paper  goes  on to  examine  the  implications  of zonsumption,  income,
corporate,  ind  capital  gains  taxes. The  paper  finds  that  direct  or indirect
taxes  associated  with  stock  market  transactions  reduce  the  fraction  of
resources  devoted  to firms,  slow  the  rate  of  human  capita accumulation,  and
retard  per capita  output  growth. Thus,  given  different  policies  toward
financial  markets,  this  paper  explains  cross-counitry  and intertemporal
differences  in growth  rates;  the inability  of  measured  factor  inputs  to  explain
these  differences;  and the  close  association  between  the  relative  size  of the
financial  market  and  economic  growth.
I. The  Basic  Endozenous  Grovth  Model
This section  presents  an endogenous  growth  model  without  financial
markets. The model  uses  the  Diamond  arnd  Dybvig  (1983)  structure  of preferences
to create  liquidity  risk,  and also  includes  productivity  shocks  that create
production  risk.  Later  sections  study  the  effects  of stock  markets  and  policy.
I.A.  Preferences  and  Technologies
The economy  consists  of an infinite  sequence  of three  period  lived
generations  with the  same  countable  infinity  of agents  born each  period. Young
agents  are identical  with  utility  functions
[c 2 +  OC37
(1)  u(c,c,.,c 3)  - - - where  7  >  0,
'y+l  is the  coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion,  and  ci is age  i  consumption.
Since there  is no utility  from  age  one  consumption,  all  income  is  saved. Thus,
the  financial  system  and  policy  cannot  alter  the  savings  rate.-5-
The  arent-specific,  privately  observed  random  variable +  becomes  known
at the star:  of the  second  period  of life,  and is  distributed
0  with probability  1-r
(2)  + 
1  with probability  ir.
The  preferened  structure  implies  a "desire  for  liquidity"  because  agents
want to consume  their  wealth  at  age  two  if  0-0.  Since  each  agent's  "type"  (X)
is unknown  at age  one, there  is "liquidity  risk." But,  there  is  no aggregate
liquidity  risk:  (1-X)  of each  generation  are  type  0 and  w are  type 1.
Since types  are  not  publicly  observable,  insurance  contracts  tied  to the
observation  of each agent's  type  cannot  eliminate  private  liquidity  risk.
Young  agents  are endcwed  with  one  unit of labor  that  is inelastically
supplied  to firms. Agents  born  in  period  t  work,  receive  wage  w., and  make
investment  allocation  decisions.
There  are  two  production  opportunities.  The  first  is  a liquid  "storage"
technology. Investment  of one  gc.  at t  yields  n  > 0 goods  at t+l  or t+2. The
second  production  technology  involves  the  risky  and illiquid  activity  of
forming  and  investing  in "firms"  that  have  a higher  expected  return  than  the
liquid  technology. In a two-stage,  two-period  process,  consumption  goods  are
produced  using  capital,  labor,  and  human  capital. Human  capital  is  non-
tradable  and  represents  the  knowledge  and  skills  embodied  in ir.dividuals.
In the  first  stage  of firm  production,  individuals  augment  human  capital.
This takes  period  t+l  and some  of  period  t+2,  so that  only  age  three  agents
have human  capital. Each  individual's  accumulation  of  human  capital  depends
positively  on (1)  his interactions  with  othezs  [Lucas  1988];  (2)  the  amount  of
resources  invested  by the individual  [Rebelo  1988;  and  King  and  Rebelo  1988];
and (3)  the  average  amrount  of capital  invested  and  maintained  in the  firm  fortwo  periods. Letting  q equal  the  fraction  of age  one income  (wt)  invested  in
the firm  by an sgent  born in t,  his  human  capital  (h)  is
(3)  ht+2 - HWt 2 (qwt)  ,  1  <  6, e  <  0,
where  H is  a constant,  qwt  is the  resources  invested  by the  agent,  and  Wt+2 is
the  average  quantity  of resources  maintained  in the  firm  between  t  and t+2:
Wt+2 - ('--  a)(qwt)/,  where a  is the average fraction of resourcer removed
from  firms  at t+l,  qwt ls  the  average  quantity  of resources  per entrepreneur
invested  at t,  and  w  is the  fraction  of initial  members  remaining  at t+2. The
externality  associated  with physical  capital  in  the  creation  of h-uman  capical
may arise  for  a  number  of reasons. First,  there  may  be a public  good
externality  associated  with firm  resources. Second,  a member  who  benefits  from
his own investment  will influence  the  human  capital  of others  via group
interactions.  Finally,  resources  invested  by one  member  may allow  him  to
interact  more with  others,  so that the  human  capital  of other  members  rises
independently  of their  own investments.
In the  second  stage  of firm  production,  age  three  firm  members  with  human
capital  - 'entrepreneurs"  - hire  age  one  workers  and  produce  goods  (y):
(4)  Yt+2  - 4t+ 2ht+ 2Lt+2,  0 <  a  <  1,
where  Lt+ 2 is  age  one labor  units  hired  per  entrepreneur  in t+2  and  t is a
firm  specific  productivity  shock  with  an expected  value  of one.7 ht+ 2 is the
level  of human  capital  per  entreprenaur  at t+2. 8'9 Firm investment  is
illiquid. An investor  who  prematurely  liquidates  firm  capital  at t+l  receives
a very low  return  of  x goods  per investment,  where  0 < x < n.7-
The labor  market  is competitive,  and labor  is supplied  inelastically.
Age one labor  is  paid a  wage rate  equal  to its  expected  marginal  product.
(5)  w  - (1-O)ht+ 2L- t+2  t+2  t+2'
Therefore,  the  return  to  each age  three  entrepreneur  in  firm  j  is
(6  r2  - t+  a  -l] h  L  1 9
- '7  +e  -i  O  L19  E
(6)  rJ  ~  vt  2  - °t2  t+2  t+2  t+2  t+2  t;2  t
Human capital  (h)  positively  influences  production,  the  wage  rate,  and the
return  to entrepreneurs.
I.B.  Non-Stock  Market  Economy:  Trading.  Equilibrium.  and  Growth
Agents  born at t  work during  t,  receive  wage  wt, and  choose  to invest  the
proportion  q in firm  J, placing  the  remaining  resources  in the  safe,  liquid
asset.  At age  two,  type  0 agents  consume  their  stored  goods  ((l-q)wtn]  plus
the  premat-ire  liquidation  value  of their  firm  investment  [xqwt1. They regret
having  invested  in firms. Since  all  type  0 agents  remove  their  firm  resources
at t+l, the  average  amount  of capital  maintained  in firms  for  two  periods,
t+2, is lower  than  if  no resources  were  removed  prematurely.
At age ,  type  1  agents  do not liquidate  firm  capital. In fact,
type  1 agents  wish they  had invested  more  in the  firm  because  the  expected
return  is higher  than  the  liquid  asset. At age  three.  type  1 agents  complete
the  human capital  accumulation  stage  of firm  production. They  hire age  one
labor,  produce  goods  given  a productivity  shock,  pay labor,  and  distribute
profits  based  on initial  investments.  Thus,  type  1 agents  consume  their  stored
goods ((l-q)w  n] plus the  profits  from  the  firm  in  which  they  invested  rj t  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~t+2'- 8 -
Thus,  a representative  agent  born at t  solves  the  problem
(7)  ~(l1lr)(qw  x +  (1-q)w  n)]  r[  +  (l-q)HW  (nwt)
(7)  max z  [  (;f)qtX  (-)tn)  t  +2  01Ht+2(qe  Lt;2  + (1-q)wtn]  Y
q  7  7  -
where  E  is the  expected  value  opprator  with  respe-t  to the  distribution  on
Since  only  X  of a generation  become  entrepreneurs  and  Lt is age  one labor  per
entrepreneur, Lt - 1/ti.  Also,  in this  economy,  all  type  0 agents  prematurely
remove  firm  capit_.  no that  f-  1-w. Thus,  in  equilibrium,
(8)  L  - O-1  and  af)  - (1-a)()/W  - wtq. t  t+2  ('
The first  order  condition  after  substituting  (8)  and  assuming  c  +  6 - 1 is 10
(9)  (l-w)(x  - n]  +  t  E  [  ((+-1l)eH - n  1  °
xq +  n(l-q)  ]l+  e  [(  (+O-l)HOq  +  n(l-q)  I1+-J
The first  term  in (9)  is the  increment  to  utility  if  q is  marginally  increased
given  that  the  agent  is type  0; the  second  term  is the  expected  increment  to
utility  if q is  marginally  increased  given  that  the  agent  is type  1.  There  is
a solution  to (9)  where  0  s q S 1 if  weOHo  > n > x >  0, and  x can  be set  close
to zero.  This  condition  merely  requires  that  the  expected  return  from  firm
investment  is  greater  than  the  return  to liquid  assets  which in turn  is
greater  than  the  premature  liquidation  value  of firm  capital. 11.9-
Assume  that  irOHO  >  n >  x >  0 and  use  the  standard  decomposition  on (9),
(10)  (l-w)(x  - n]  +  [(eOH  - n]  +
xq + n(l-q)]  +7  (OHOq  + n(l.q)]l+7
+  wCov[  ((+8-D)HO  - nl,  n]  _  J  0.
t  ~~~~[(j+8-1)HOq  + n(l-q)].  1+7J
The covariance  term  is - contingent  on the  agent  being  type  1 - the  covariance
between  the  expected  return  to marginally  increasing  firm  investment  and  the
marginal  utility  of  consumption. This  covariance  is  always  negative.
To examine  the  factors  determining  the  portfolio  decision  (q)  first
assume  that the  productivJty  shock  has  zero  variance  (qji  - 1  for  all  j), which
implies  that  the  covariance  term in (10)  is zero,  and  solve  for  q.
1
(11) q  n(A-l),  where  X _ r  (eR.n)  1  ,  where  R - HO+.
(R-n)  + A(n-x)  (l-x)(n-x)
The fra-.tion  of resources  allocated  to firms  depends  positively  on the  share
of output  going  to entrepreneurs  (O),  the  rate  of  human  capital  accumulation
(H),  labor  per  entrepreneur  (#),  the  liquidation  value  of firm  investment  (x),
the  probability  of being  type  1 (ir),  and  the  fraction  of  marginal  returns
internalized  by individuals  (e).12 Finally,  the  greater  the  degree  of
relative  risk  aversion  (7),  the  lower  is  the  amount  invested  in  firms
Now let the  variance  of the  productivity  shock  be greater  than  zero,  so
that the  covariance  term  in (10)  is negative,  not zero.  Note  that  the
summation  of the  first  two terms  in  (10)  varies  inversely  with  q.  Therefore,
if the  variance  of  e  increases,  the  absolute  value  of the  covariance  term- 10  -
i-c,reases,  so that  q  must fall  to satisfy  conditior  (10). The economic
implication  of this finding  is intuitively  appealing:  the  variance  of the
productivity  shock  discourages  risk  averse  investors  from  investing  in  firms.
Consequently,  a market  that  allows  investors  to  diversify  risk  will induce
individuals  to invest  more  in firms.
The two  period  equilibrium  growth  rate  of this  economy  is:
gy-  yt+2'yt - ht+ 2/ht  - HWt+ 2(
ht
Substituting  equilibrium  values  and  letting  p  - (1-9)X@,
(12)  g  - Hf(l-O)weJq  - Hpq  - Hp  r  n(o-l)  ]
Y  L(R-n)  +  A(n-x)J
Per capita  growth  is inextricably  linked  to  human  capital  accumulation:  the
faster  the  rate  of human  capital  accumulation,  the  faster  is the  growth  rate
of per capita  output. In general,  gy  may  be greater  or less  than  one  so that
growth  may  be positive  or negative.
Three  points  are  worth  noting  here.  First,  since  the  aggregate  savings
rate is trivially  set  to one,  only  the  form  of savings  (q)  and the  efficiency
with which  resources  are  employed  (Q)  can  alter  growth. Second,  since  I-M
of the  population  are  type  0, they  prematurely  remove  their  capital  from
firr-s.  This  lowers  firm  efficiency  by reducing  the  rate  of  human  capital
accumulation  of remaining  firm  members  which  slows  economic  growth. Thus,  an
institution  or market  that  helps  minimize  the  ].iquidation  of capital  will
increase  firm  efficiency  and  may  also  encourage  firm  investment.  Finally,
productivity  risk  retards  economic  growth  by reducing  the  fraction  of- 11  -
resources allocated to firms.  A financial arrangement that allows agents to
diversify against productivity shocks will raise q and accelerate growth.
II. Stock Markets and Growth
Liquidity risk and productivity risk create incentives for the formation
of stock markets.  Productivity risk lowers  welfare and discourages agents
from investing in firms.  Stock markets allow investors to invest in a large
number of firms and diversify away idiosyncratic  productivity shocks.  This
raises welfare, the fraction of resources invested in firms, and the economy's
steady state growth rate.  In addition, liquidity risk also tends to lower
welfare and firm investment.  At the  beginning of period two, the liquidity
shock is revealed.  Those who value period three consumption (type l's) want
to buy more shares while those receiving liquidity shocks (type O's) want to
consume their wealth at age two.  In the previous section, there was no
mechanism by which heterogeneous agents could trade, so that type 0 agents
prematurely withdrew capital from firms to the detriment of remaining firm
members.  With a "stock market", however, agents can conduct mutually and
socially beneficial transactions.  In principle, ownership trading in response
to liquidity shocks could could occur strictly  within firms even when types
are not publicly observable.  Public stock markets, however, provide a
standardized mechanism for satisfying liquidity requirements, and stock
markets allow individuals to  hold diversified portfolios.
Stock markets affect growth in two ways.  The first involves firm
efficiency and depends on the externality in human capital production.  Stock
markets increase firm efficiency by eliminating the premature withdrawal of
capital from firms.  This accelerates the growth rate of human capital and per
capita output.  The second way stock markets can affect growth is to raise the- 12 -
fraction  of resources  devoted  to firms. This  does  not  necessarily  depend  on
externalities.  By increasing  the  liquidity  of firm  investment,  reducing
productivity  risk,  and improving  firm  efficiency,  stock  markets  encourage  firm
investment. This stimulates  human  capital  production  and  growth.
II.A.  Stock  Market  Eguilibrium
Stock  market  transactions  occur  in the  first  part  of each  period. Age
one  agents  form  firms  and sell  shares  - claims  on t+2  profits. Agents  invest
in a large  number  of firms  to diversify  against  productivity  shocks. At the
beginning  of t+l,  agents  learn  their  types. The  resulting  heterogeneity
creates  an incentive  for  stock  transactions.  Agents  who  do not  value  age
three  consumption  will sell shares  as long  as they  receive  a price  at least
equal  to the  liquidation  value  of firm  capital  (x). Agents  who  value  period
three  consumption  will  purchase  more  shares  as long  as the  price  in terms  of
stored  goods  is less  than  one.
Letting  P equal  the  period  two  stock  market  price  of claims  to period
three  goods,  a rational  expectations  equilibrium  involves:  (i)  finding  agents'
optimal  consumption/investment  decisions  in  period  two,  given  P and  period  one
investment  decisions;  (ii)  finding  a P that  clears  the  market  in-period  two,
given  period  one investment  decisions;  (iii)  finding  the  optimal  period  one
investment  decision,  given  P; and (iv)  requiring  period  one  market  clearing.
Using "s'  to  distinguish  the  stock  market  economy  from  the  financially
autarkic  economy,  a preliminary  result  will  help  characterize  the  equilibrium.
ProRosition  1: In an economy  with a stock  market,  if elRs  >  n > x, then
(i)  no firm resources  are  prematurely  liquidated;  and
(ii)  all  stored  goods  are  consumed  by type  0 agents.
Proof:  See  Appendix  A.  Note  R  O9Hw- 13 -
The condition  for  Proposition  1 to  hold, etRR  >  n  >  x, has already  been
assumed,  and  the implications  for  violating  the  condition  are  discussed  in
footnote 11).
Given  Proposition  1, type  0 agents  consume  their  stored  goods
[(l-qs)nwt]  plus the  stock  market  value  of their  claims  to  period  t+2  firm
produced  goods,  i.e.,  the  value  of their  firm  stock (Pw0XH(4s )  6(qsw  )  l.
Type 1 agents consume their initial share of firm outpult  (1r8,H(fwt 2)6(qsw,)E]
plus the  additional  share  of firm  output  that  they  purchase  on the  stock
market  with stored  goods ((1-qs)nwt]  in t+l.
p
Assuming  that  agents  hold diversified  portfolios,  agents  solve
(13) max  -j  1 j  [(l-qs)nwt +  PxekH(oTs 2)6(qswt)  ]
(1r[we#H((t+ 2 )6(qswt)e  +  (l-q 5)nwt
As Proposition  1 establishes,  no firm  capital  is liquidated;  thus,  (1-al)  - 1,
so that  st+2 - w q /1.
Solving  (13)  and  using  these  equilibrium  conditions  yieids
(14)  ewRRsP  - n.
Now,conjctur  tha  ~  - (1-q  )n  s Now, conjecture that p  __(1__)n_  substitute into (14) and solve for q
(1-r)R  q
s  _  r  13 (15)  q  l- +e_- 14 -
The  period  one investment  decision  does  not depend  on risk  aversion  because
individuals  face  a fixed,  linear  price  for  claims  on period  three  goods. A
change  in  q by any individual  does  not  affect  stock  prices. 14
In  comparing  the investment  decision  in  an economy  with a stock  market
(15)  with that  of a non-stock  market  economy  (11),  there  are  parameterizations
such that  without  a stock  market  there  is  no investment  in firms,  but the  mere
addition  of stock  markets  changes  incentives  sufficiently  so that  individuals
invest  in firms. Since  firm  investment  permits  human  capital  creation  and
growth,  financial  policies  that  prohibit  the  formation  of capital  markets  may
severely  discourage  technological  progress  and  economic  development.
II.B.  The Growth  Rate  with a Stock  Market
The (two  period)  equilibrium  growth  rate  is
(16)  g  - Hr  pq  - Hr  p  ex
y  ~~~~~~~~~~~1-*f+e  ir
In comparing  the  growth  rate  of the  stock  market  economy  with that  of
the  non-stock  market  economy,  tLere  are  two  channels  through  which  stock
markets  influence  growth. First,  stock  markets  increase  firm  efficiency.
5 Even if the  the  investment  decisions,  q and  q ,  are equal,  the  stock  market
economy  will grow  faster  than  the  non-stock  market  economy  because  stock
markets  eliminate  the  premature  liquidation  of firm  capital. Instead  of
liquidating  capital,  agents  that  receive  liquidity  shocks  sell  their  shares  to
agents  that  value  period  three  consumption.  Consequently,  more  capital  is
maintained  in firms  for  two  periods  which  accelerates  the  rate  of  human
capital  accumulation. Formally,  the  externality  associated  with  capital  in- 15  -
the  production  of human  capital,  W, rises  from  qw  in the  non-stock  market
economy  to qw/i in the  stock  market  economy.
The second  way in  which  stock  markets  influence  growth  is  by increasing
the fraction  of resources  allocated  to  firms. As equations  (13)  and (16)
demonstrate,  the  higher  the  proportion  of the  economy's  resources  invested  in
firms  the  faster  will be the  steady  state  growth  rate.  If agents  are
sufficiently  risk  averse,  the  proportion  of resources  devoted  to firms  is
higher  with a stock  market  (qs>q). By  allowing  agents  to diversify
productivity  risk,  stock  markets  encourage  risk  averse  agents  to invest  more
in firms.  In addition,  stock  markets  reduce  the  liquidity  risk  associated
with firm investment:  agents  that  receive  liquidity  shocks  can  sell their
shares  for  more than the  liquidation  value  of firm  capital. Finally,  by
increasing  firm  efficiency,  stock  markets  raise  the  return  on firm investment.
Thus,  the emergence  of stock  markets  to  manage  productivity  and  liquidity
risk  accelerates  growth  by attracting  resources  to socially  productive  firms.
Since  the  savings  rate  is fixed  at  one in  this  model,  stock  markets  may
only  promote  growth  by increasing  the  productivity  of firms  or improving  the
allocation  of resources. This coincides  with the  World  Bank's  (1989)  finding
of a positive  relationship  between  the  efficiency  of investment  - the  change
in  GNP divided  by investment  - and  the  rslative  size  of the  financial  system
but little  relationship  between  financial  markets  and  savings  rates.- 16 -
III.  Tax  Policy.  The  Stock  Market.  and  Growth
The source  of growth  in this  model  is  human  capital  creation. Since  the
rate  of human  capital  accumulation  is  positively  related  to the  quantity  of
resources  invested  and  maintained  in  firms,  public  policies  that  lower
investment  in firms,  ceteris  paribus,  lower  per  capita  growth  rates.
Therefore,  either  a reduction  in the  fraction  of an economy's  resources
devoted  to  human  capital  augmenting  firms  or a reduction  in  the  total  quantity
of resources  available  for investment  will lower  the  economy's  growth  rate.
This section  formally  verifies  this  intuition  by examining  the
implications  of  four  marginal  taxes:  a consumption  tax (r  c),  a tax  on  wage
earnings  (rw),  a corporate  or firm  tax  (r  f),  and  a capital  gains  tax (rg),
which taxes  stock  market  transactions  at rate  rg.  The  taxes  alter  equations
(1), (5),  and (6). Using logarithmic  preferences  to simplify  derivations,
(I )  u(cl,c 2 c3) - Qn[(l-r  )c 2 +  O(l-1c)c 3 +  T],  T is  government  transfers,
cS')  wt+2 - (l-r  f)(l-r )(1-0) waht+2,15
(6')  rJ  - (l-rf)[jJ +0+-1] ht+ Lt;2 t2  t+2  t+2  t+2
Individuals  have  no influence  over government  transfers,  and  the  government
does not investment.
Given the  revised  structure,  Proposition  1  becomes:
Proposition  2: if (1-rg)(1-rf)efRS  >  n  > x, then
(i) no firm  resources  are  prematurely  liquidated;  and
(ii)  all stored  goods  are  consumed  by type  0 agents.
Proof:  Straightforward  given  the  proof  to Proposition  1 in  Appendix  A.- 17 -
Intuitively,  the  proposition  indicates  that,  as long  as the  tax  system  does
not alter  the  model's  structure,  no firm  capital  is  prematurely  liquidated,
and  all liquid  assets  are "paid"  to  agents  that  do not  value  period  three
consumption  in exchange  for  their  claims  to  period  three  goods.
Assuming  that  agents  hold diversified  portfolios,  agents  solve
(17)  max  -(1.j  In[(l-rC)(l-q)nwt  +  (l-TC)(l-rg)(l--rf)P  8fHQ"  (qw  el
- vJ  In[(l-rc)(l-vrf)w8,OHWT0 2(qw  )  +  (1-rc)(l-q)nw
The first  order  condition  after  substituting  the  equilibrium  conditions  is
(20)  f)PewRs - n]  _  1rn - (1-rf)PeirRs
[ (l-q)n  +  (1-rg)(-rf)PwRsq  ]  [  (l-q)n  +  (l-rf)PrR'q  ]
The first  policy  result  is immediate. Since  the  consumption  tax  does  not
appear  in the first  order  condition,  it  does  not  affect  investment  decisions
or the  economy's  growth  rate. This  occurs  because  the  consumption  tax  affects
all elements  of utility  equally. If leisure  were  valued  but  not taxed,  or
partially  taxed,  then  a rise in  the  consumption  tax  would  induce  a
substitution  into  leisure  and  a reduction  in growth.- 18 -
Now, conjecture  that  P  ( 1 - and  solve  for  q: 6
f  s-s
(19)  qST  _  (ir/(l-ir)1  Elr[l+(l.)]  +  (l-rg)e
(ir/(1-wr))  (I  + 1 r+e][i1 -r+(l-rg)pr  +  lr+1r)e
where the  superscript  "sr"  signifies  the  stock  market  economy  with taxes.
The per  capita  growth  rate is
(20) g  - h  fh  - (l-rt)(lr2)Hhtpq
Equation  (20)  indicates  that  wage  and  corporate  taxes  lower  growth  by
reducing  the  quantity  of resources  available  for  future  production. Since
wages  equal  savings,  a  wage tax  is a direct  tax  on investable  resources.
Since  all  wages  are  not saved,  this  model  exaggerates  the  effect  of a  wage tax
on growth. Similarly,  the  corporate  tax  shifts-back  the  demand  curve  for
labor  and  reduces  the  equilibrium  wage rate,  lowering  investment. If the
corporate  tax  is large  enough,  firm investment  and  growth  will end.
Capital  gains  taxes,  or in this  model  taxes  on stock  market
transactions,  also  affect  per capita  growth  rates. The capital  gains  tax  may
be broadly  interpreted  as official  regulations  and  impediments  to financial
market  transactions  as  well as direct  taxation  of stock  market  activities.
These "taxes"  do not  directly  lower  the  quantity  of investable  resources.
Rather,  capital  gains  taxes  alter  resource  allocation  by reducing  the  expected
after-tax  re-sale  value  of firm  stock. This  reduces  the fraction  of resources
invested  in  firms  and  the  economy's  steady  state  growth  rate. 17 Thus,  cross-
country  differences  in financial  market  policies  may  help explain  the  observed
differences  in  per capita  growth  rates. If the  impediments  to capital  market- 19  -
transactions  are large  enough  to cause  financial  dis-intermediation,  the
economy  returns  to the  slower  growth  equilibrium  of financial  autarky.
The relative  size  of the  financial  system  as a fraction  of gross
domestic  product  is a commonly  used  measure  of the  significance  of the
financial  system. In the  current  model,  this  may  be approximated  by taking
the  ratio  of stock  market  transactions  of generation  t (transactions  in t+l)
to the  output  generated  by generation  t (production  in t+2).  For  example,
with an economy  with  only  a corporate  tax,  this  ratio  is (l-fr)(l-r  )G.  Since
ST  f  -ST7S
the growth rate of this economy is gy  - (l-T )H7i pq  and  qs" is
independent  of r ,  the  relative  size  of the  financial  system  will  be
positively  correlated  with the  economy's  growth  rate.
The model  has  many avenues  through  which  public  policy  can  positively
influence  welfare. For  example,  the  government  could  perform  the  revenue
neutral  policy  of raising  consumption  taxes  and  reducing  corporate  taxes.
This would reduce  distortions,  increase  the  allocation  of resources  to firms,
and speed  the  economy's  growth  rate. One  could  also  study  the  growth  effects
of s.  scific  types  of public  expenditures  as in  Barro  (1990).
In this  model,  one  can ask:  which  marginal  tax  reduction  induces  the
greatest  improvement  in  growth? Appendix  B shows  that  the  wage  and  corporate
taxes  are  more potent  than  the  capital  gains  tax  when  evaluated  at small
marginal  tax  rates.  Since  the  corporate  and  wage taxes  are taxes  on savings,
their  effects  are  probably  exaggerated.  Therefore,  this  result  should  not  be
taken too  seriously  but instead  stimulate  further  inquiry  in  to the
relationship  between  policy,  financial  markets,  and  growth.20 -
rv.  Conclusion
This  paper  addressed  the  question:  how does  trading  of financial  assets
and  public  policy  affect  economic  growth? The  paper  examines  a model  in  which
liquidity  and  productivity  risk  elicit  the  creation  of a stock  market  and
studies  how the resulting  stock  market  changes  the  incentives  of investors  in
ways that  alter  steady  state  growth  rates. In  particular,  stock  markets
accelerate  growth  by (1)  facilitating  the  ability  to trade  ownership  of firms
without  disrupting  the  productive  processes  occurring  within  firms;  and (2)
allowing  investors  to  hold  diversified  portfolios. Public  policy  in this
model  influences  growth  directly  by altering  investment  incentives  and
indirectly  by affecting  the  functioning  of financial  markets  in  ways that
alter  investment  incentives. Thus,  within  the  context  of a simple  model,  this
paper  helps  explain  the  documented  relationship  between  financial  development,
long-run  growth,  and  policy. Unfortunately,  there  is  no channel  in this  model
through  which  economic  growth  can  stimulate  changes  in financial  markets.
In the  model,  growth  only  occurs  if society  invests  and  maintains  a
sufficient  amount  of capital  in firms  that  in the  process  of production
augment  human  capital  and  technology.  The  more resources  allocated  to  firms,
the  more  rapid  is  economic  growth. An externality  in  firm  production  implies
that  the  economy  grows  faster  when investors  do  not  prematurely  liquidate  firm
capital  to  satisfy  short-run  liquidity  needs. Thus,  financial  arrangements
that  encourage  firm investment  or eliminate  the  premature  reuQval  of firm
cap 4 tal  accelerE  :e  the steady  state  growth  rate  of  per capita  output.
Stock  markets  arise  in this  model  to  help  agents  manage  liquidity  and
productivity  risk,  and, in  so doing,  stock  markets  accelerate  growth. In the
absence  of financial  markets,  firm  specific  productivity  shocks  may discourage
risk  averse  investors  from  investing  in firms. Stock  markets,  however,  allow-21  -
individuals  to invest  in a large  number  of firms  and  diversify  against
idiosyncratic  firm  shocks. This raises  the  fraction  of resources  allocated  to
firms,  expediteE  human  capital  accumulation,  and  promotes  economic  growth.
Without  stock  markets,  liquidity  shocks  not  only  discourage  firm
investment,  they  also  reduce  firm  productivity.  Liquidity  shocks  force  some
agents  to remove  capital  from  firms  prematurely  and receive  a low  return.
Premature  capital  liquidation  lowers  firm  productivity,  and the  possibility  of
receiving  a low  liquidation  return  discourages  firm  investment.  Stock  markets
allow  those  agents  plagued  by liquidity  shocks  to sell their  stock  to  other
investors  for  more  than  the  liquidation  value  of their  firm  capital. Thus,
stock  markets  can  accelerate  growth  directly  by increasing  firm  productivity
and indirectly  by encouraging  firm  1'ivestment.
The paper  shows  that  taxing  or impeding  financial  market  activity  lowers
per  capita  growth  rates. If we take  poLicies  toward  financial  markets  as
given  exogenously,  policy  can explain  the  three  stylized  facts  discussed  in
the  Introduction.  That is,  different  policies  toward  financial  markets  can
lead to  vastly  different  long-run  per  capita  growth  rates;  they  can  lead  to
these  differences  without  relying  on variations  in  capital  and labor;  and
these  policy  differences  will induce  the  observed  positive  correlation  between
financial  market  activity  and  growth.- 22 -
ADpendix  A
This  appendix  proves  proposition  1, derives  W in the  stock  markat
economy,  and  demonstrates  that  individuals  voluntarily  relinquish  the  option
of prematurely  liquidating  firm  capital  if  a stock  market  exists.
At age  2 each  agent  has a  claim  to  w96HW6T+,(qwt)6  units  of period  3
goods given  period  I decisions. He can  turn  these  claims  into  xqw  period
2 consumption  goods. Recall  that  w9OHW0  2(qw  )E  > xqw.
The period  2 supply  and  demand  curves  for  claims  to period  3 goods
demonstrate  that  a rational  expettations  equilibrium  implies  that  no firm
resources  are  prematurely  removed. If P  > 1,  AU  agents  sell  claims  on period
3 goods.  At P - 1, type  I agents  are indifferent  between  selling  or not
selling  claims  to  period  3 goods. Set  P  - x/f1#HIW+I 2(qw)  ].  At P  <  P  <1,
type 1 agents  do  not sell  claims  to  period  3 goods  while  type  0 agents  sell
all their  claims. If P - P, type  0 agents  are indifferent  between  liquidating
firm investment  and  selling  their  claims  to period  3 goods. And, for  P  <  P,
type  0 agents  liquidate  their  stake  in  the  firm;  there  is  no supply  of claims
to period  3 consumption  goods. This  gives  rise  to the  period  2  stock  market
supply  curve  for  period  3  consumption  goods  depicted  in  Figure  1  as abadef.
The demand  curve  for  period  3  goods  is givea  in  Figure  1 as  AkBCDE. At
P >  1, no agent  reliquishes  period  2  goods  for  period  3  goods  At P  - 1, type
1 agents  are  indifferent  between  consuming  their  stored  goods  in  period  2 or
purchasing  period  3 goods. At P  < P  <  1, type 1  agents  use  stored  goods  to
purchase  period  3 goods. At P - P, type  1 agents  not only  want  to purchase
period  3 goods  with stored  goods  but are  also indifferent  between  liquidating
firm  capital  and  purchasing  period  3 goods  via the  stock  market. Finally,  at
P < P, type 1  agents  want to  use stored  goods  and  the  liquidation  value  of
firm  capital  to  purchase  period  3  goods  in the  stock  market.- 23 -
A rational  expectations  equilibrium  does  not  exist  at P  >  1  or P  <  P.
At P < P, everyone  liquidates  investment  in  all  firms. Also, P  <  P implies
that  all  agents  store  more  goods  in  period  1.18 If everyone  stores  more
goods,  the  demand  curve  shifts  out  and  the  supply  curve  shifts  back so that
the intersection  occurs  on the  CD part  of the  demand  curve  and  the za  part  of
the  supply  curve.  This implies  that  no capital  is liquidated  (a  i-C),  and
W6- (qw/ir)S.  The relevant  supply  curve  is  vertical  at (l-wr)wRSqw;  therefore,
individuals  voluntarily  relinquish  the  option  of liquidating  firm  capital.
If P > 1, everyone  increases  period  1  firm  investment.  Such  a P is
not a rational  expectations  equilibrium.  The  altered  investment  decision
causes  the  demand  and supply  curves  to  shift  until  an intersection  occurs  on
CD and  cd.  Thus,  all stored  goods  are  consumed  by type  0 agents  (a  - 1).
Thus,  if £1r8OHff  6>  n >  x, a rational  expeetations  equilibrium  can  only
occur  on the  Cb part of the  demand  curve  and  the  cd  part of the  supply  curve;
all of the  goods  stored  in period  1 are  consumed  by type  0 agents,  and  no
physical  investment  in the  firms  is  removed  prematurely.- 24 -
ADendix P.
This  appendix  (1)  derives  the  investment  decision  in a stock  market
economy  and taxes  that satisfies  the  rational  expectations  equilibrium
conditions;  (2)  derives  the  effect  of a  marginal  change  in the  capital  gains
tax  on investment  and  growth;  and (3)  demonstrates  that  a marginal  reduction
in the  wage  or corporate  taxes  has a  more  positive  impact  on growthl  than  e.
marginal  reduction  in the  capital  gains  tax.
A. Derivation  of ast
The  maximization  problem  is  given  by equation  (17)  in  the  text:
(i7)  max - l.  ]n[(l-r  )(l-q,nwt  +  (1-rc)(l-rg)(l-f  )PirOHWt+ 2 (
- i)ln[(l-rc)(l-rf)W1r  IH+ 2 (qwt)  +  (l-rc)(l-q)nwt].
P
The first  order  condition  after  substituting  the  equilibrium  conditions  is
(18)  (1-w)[(l-rg)(1-rf)PewRs  - n]  w(n - (l-rf)Pe7rRsJ.
(l-q)n  +  (1-rg)(1-rf)PR  q  (l-q)n  +  (l-rf'iNRsq  ]
Conjecture  that  p  - (l-q)n  and  solve  for  q.  Substituting,
(1-v f)(l-r)R  qs
(B1)  (l-X)  [(l-vrg)e(l-q)/(l-w)q - 11  _  i[  - ei(l-q)/(l-w)q]
[(l-q)  +  (l-rg)w(l-q)/l-  ]  [(r(l-q)/(l-*)  +  (l-q)]- 25 -
Simplifying  yields
(B2)  (1-i)  [(1-r 8)ew(l-q)  - (l-w)qJ _ if  ((l-w)q  -
(1  - nr  +  (l-r 8)if]
and
(B3)  q  (1  - n +  (1-rg. 7 )e  +  (1-v  )if  - i1  - i+  (1-g)t  ]
q [1  - +  e xr]  - (1-i)
Now, let:
a  - i  - w  +  er,  A  -e,
b  - 1 - x  +  'l-r9)cx,  B - (1-rg)cf,  and  C - 1-i +  (l-rg)i,  so that
(B4)  qb  + B _wC
qa - A  1-i
where  a >  b, A >  B, a  >  A, and  b >  B
Finally,  solving  for  q  yields  equation  (19)  in the  text:
AC +  B
(21)  q-  1-i
i_aC +  b
1-ir
B. The Effects  of the  Capital  Gains  Tax
Note that
(B5)  _  _ aa  _  aB  _ ab _  A, and  aC  _i[l  - +  (1  - .&'i]<  O
arg  arg  arg  arg  arg- 26  -
Therefore,
4L~  ~i  A __  ][.'aCb  Lr.i  ac  -A[..iCB
(qsBr  aj 1 J  8rg  ]LL0g  J  ]  0 J  g  I[-i]  ]
arg  D
where  D  [(lr]aC  +  b]2
To sign this  derivative  consider  the  numerator  of (B6)  which  equals
(B7)  (  "(tC  j1[Ab  - aB] - f..fjAC[a  - A]  - A(b  - B].
1  ¢ a  -r-gJ  1
Since  a >  A and  b >  B,  the  last  two  terms  of (B7)  are  negative. Recall  that
C  <  0.  If  Ab  - aB  >  0, then  the  first  term  is  negative  and  Oq  is  negative.
a3rg  a,g
Ab - aB  - elr[(l-r  +  (l-rg)ew)  - (l-rg)(l  - i  +  er)]
- ea[(l-ir)  +  (l-rg)er  - (l-rg)(l1-r)  - (l-rg)elr]
- eir(l-lI)rg  >  0,
so that  aq  < 0,  which  necessarily  implies  that  ag  < O.
arg  arg
C. Tax Rate  ComRarison
Now compare  the  growth  effects  of  marginally  altering  the  wage,
corporate,  and  capital  gains  tax  at low  marginal  tax  rates. In particular,
evaluate  Ids  gI  |  Og
a 8 g |rW-rf-rg-o  aff  jrW-rf-rg-o arv |rw  rfw  g 0O- 27 -
First note that Og  - g  |  -Hr  pql
rf  rw-rf--.O  ar  r -r-rg-o  TI1  |-r  -T  -o
substitut.ng for  q|  yields
| rw_Tf_rgo0
(B8)  - w  _  dg  |  -H-  psi
rf  r  w-r  f-rg-O  arw rwrf-rgO  1-W+f7r
Now consider  -g  |  Hi  - q  . Noting that
arg  rwmrfm,g-O  arg  |wl.f_.g_ 0
ac  I  - -A(1+7)  and  C|  - 1, it is easy to show that
arg  Irw-r  f-rg-0  I rw~-r  frg-0
(B9)  - g  j  -Hir  6  spC(-)2
a9T ir  w-f_rg_o  (-fe2
Now compare (B8) with (B9).  Since 1 >  (1 )
(1-  i+e  i)
IAbs  ags  - Abs  dg  >  Abs ags|
ar  w  rw=rf_rg_o  arf  Ir wrf  rgg  O  rg  W-rf 7rgO
so that a marginal decrease in the wage or corporate tax  has a larger positive
impact  on growth  than a  marginal  decrease  in the  capital  gains  tax.- 28  -
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Footnotes
1. See Cameron (1967),  Goldsmith (1969),  McKinnon (1973), and Gelb (1989).
2. See Summers, Heston, and Kravis (1984) and Abramowitz (1986).  For a
different view, see Bat-mol  (1986).
3. Bencivenga and Smith (1988) construct a bank that by pooling the economy's
resources eliminates liquidity risk and invests more efficiently.  Their
equilibrium, however, suffers from Jacklin's (1987) incentive incompatibility
problem.  In Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989), growth increases participation in
a financial intermediary that provides information on the economy's aggregate
shock, which improves investment  choices.  In Greenwald and Stiglitz (1989),
market imperfections arising from asymmetric information reduce investment  and
productivity growth.
4. The literature typically  uses the terms "technology" and "human capital"
interchangeably.  Romer (1990),  however, distinguishes technology - the
instructions for combining raw materials into goods - from human capital - the
ability to follow instructions and create new instructions.  I assume that
legal or technical considerations imply that newly invented technologies are
only useful to the firms that create those new technologies.  Thus, using
Romer (1990)'s terminology, firm created technology is perfectly excludable
and therefore economically indistinguishable from rival goods such as human
capital.
5. In particular, banks that offer the type of returns suggested by Diamond
and Dybvig (1983) could not coexist with stock markets.
6. This is proven in Levine (1990).  Within the Diamond and Dybvig (1983)
model, Levine (1990) evaluates and ranks by the level of expected utility
the equilibrium allocation of resources produced under various financial
structures, e.g., stock markets, banks, mutual funds, and various trading
restrictions.
7. Formally, for each firm indexed by j, ;J  is drawn from the distribution- 31 -
function G(rItl  on a compact interval fr,  ],  where v  >  1 - O, and where
E(q]  - fqdG(n)  - 1.
8. To focus on the role of technology and human capital in development, this
paper abstracts from physical factor accumulation in consumption goods
production.  Nevertheless, capital is pivotal in human capital creation, and
the model can be easily extended to include capital resources in the
production  of consumption goods without altering the results, e.g., think of h
as a composite human/physical capital good.  Interestingly, Maddison (1987)
finds that changes in measurable factor inputs such as capital and labor are
able to account for considerably less than half of the observed growth rates
in per capita output over the past one hundred years.
9. In terms of the standard neoclassical growth model, ht+2 is "technology."
In contrast to the standard growth model, technology in this model is the
result of the decisions of maximizing agents.
10. Steady state per capita growth can occur as long as e +  8  >  1.  Making
this an equality allows one to solve for a closed form solution.
11. If the return from liquid assets is  higher than the expected return from
firms, then there would be no firm investment.  If, on the other hand, the
liquidation value of firm capital is higher than the return from liquid
assets, then no agent invests in liquid assets.  Thus, if  wcOH  >  n >  x  does
not hold, a relatively uninteresting corner solution results.*
12. The term  e arises because agents do not internalize fully the effects of
investing in firms [see: equation 3].  This model incorporates the notion that
individuals perceive diminishing marginal returns to firm investment.  If
instead individuals see themselves as buying a share of final firm output
proportional  to their own investments,then  the return to firm investment is
HeOwt+2  (qw/qw).  The results under this specification can be obtained from
this paper by setting e to 1.- 32 -
13.  This P  and  q5 represent  a rational  expectations  equilibrium.  Appendix  A
finds  optimal  period  two  decisions  given  P and  q5, and  shows  the  set  of P's
S  5 that clear the-period two market.  Given q , P - n/ewR ,  which is consistent
with period  two  optimization  and  market  clearing  as described  in  Appendix  A.
S The investment  decision,  q ,  is optimal  from  the  solution  to (13),  and
qs obviously  clears  the  market  in  period  one.  Also,  note that  with a stock
market,  agents  voluntarily  relinquish  their  ability  to liquidate  firm
investment;  there  is  a vertical  supply  curve  of shares  (see:  Appendix  A].
14.  Banks,  however,  that  pool and  invest  the  savings  of individuals  recognize
that alterations  in  q change  stock  prices.  (Levine  1990].
15.  Equation  (5')  is obtained  by an entrepreneur  choosing  Lt to  maximize
(l-rf  )h  Ll9  - wbLt.  where  wb is  the  wage rate  before  labor  pays taxes.
t t  tt  I
16.  Appendix  B derives  (21). Furthermore,  it is trivial  to  verify  that  this
is a rational  expectations  equilibrium  given  the  definition  in  Section  II.
17.  Appendix  B shows  this  formally.
18.  Since  n  >  x: those  receiving  *-0  would  have  preferred  to  store  more  goods;
those  receiving  4-1  would  have  preferred  to  store  more  goods  because  then  they
would  have  more period  2 goods  with  which  to  purchase  period  3  goods  at P.
Since  all  agents  would increase  the  proportion  of stored  resources  if they
expect  P < P, such a P is  not  a rational  expectations  equilibrium.
19.  Consider,  for  example,  P  - 1. At this  price,  everyone  simply  maximizes
claims  on period  2 or period  3  goods. A  marginal  increase  in  the  proportion
of period  1  wealth  allocated  to the  firm  increases  claims
to period  2  or period  3  goods  (at  P-1)  by erO9Hi6  qH-  1, which  in
-~~  8w  and  t+2  ehihi equilibrium  equals  erO9Hf wt.  and lowers  them  by nwt.  It follows  that,
i  e9eOiHr  6>  n, then  at P  > 1, all  agents  will increase  the  proportion  of
their  period  1  wealth  invested  in the  firm.- 33  -
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